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The European Community's Amended 
Waste Directive 
INTRODUCTION 
In March 1991, the Council of the European Communities 
(Council) adopted an amendment l to the Community's frame-
work waste directive, Council Directive 75/442.2 The amendment 
is designed to increase the effectiveness of Directive 75/442, which 
requires member states to take appropriate steps to encourage 
the prevention, recycling, and proper processing of waste in or-
der to conserve natural resources. 3 The amendment reflects 
growing European Community (EC or Community) impatience 
with the failure of member states to comply with environmental 
directives in general. 4 
While the amendment expands those provlSlons of 
Directive 75/442 that were designed to encourage waste pre-
vention and recycling,5 its pnmary emphasis IS waste 
I See Directive 911156, Council Directive of 18 March 1991 amending Directive 75/442 
on waste, OJ. L78/32 (1991) [hereinafter Amendment]. 
2 See Directive 75/442, Council Directive of 15 July 1975 on waste, OJ. L194/39 (1975). 
3 Amendment, supra note 1, at art. 1(l)(arts. 3,4). Directive 75/442 describes waste as 
"any substance or object which the holder disposes of or is required to dispose of pursuant 
to the provisions of national law in force." Directive 75/442, supra note 2, at art. 1. The 
amendment provides a far more specific definition. An annex to the amendment provides 
an extensive listing of wastes covered by Directive 75/442, including expired products, 
household wastes, and various industrial wastes. See Amendment, supra note 1, at Annex 
I. The amendment does not cover gaseous effluents emitted into the atmosphere, nor 
other wastes that are covered by specific legislation such as radioactive waste, waste 
resulting from mining and extracting and related activities, animal carcasses and livestock 
waste, waste waters (except waste in liquid form), and decommissioned explosives. Id. at 
art. 2. 
4 See Community Urged to Step Up Pace, Scope of Environmental Protection Efforts, 13 Int'l 
Env't Rep. (BNA) No.7, at 284 (July 11, 1990); Clinton Davis Hits Lack of Enforcement as 
Contribution to "Democratic Deficit," 12 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 579 (Dec. 13, 1989) 
[hereinafter Clinton Davis]; Restrictive Waste Management Measures Expected from Commission, 
Attorney Says, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No.4, at 149-50 (Apr. 11, 1990) [hereinafter 
Restrictive Waste Management]. 
5 See Amendment, supra note 1, at art. 1(1)(art. 3). While earlier drafts of the amend-
ment stated that member states must take measures to prevent the creation of waste, the 
amendment now only requires member states to "encourage" the prevention of waste. 
Compare Amended proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 75/442 on waste, 
COM(89) 560 final-SYN 145,0.]. C326/6, at art. 3 (1989), with Amendment, supra note 
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disposa1.6 In an effort to ensure member state compliance, the 
amendment requires each member state to submit a more specific 
and coordinated waste disposal plan than that required under 
Directive 75/442.7 The amendment's reporting requirements 
would enable the Commission of the European Communities 
(Commission) to more closely monitor member state compliance. 8 
This Note represents a critical analysis of the amended direc-
tive. Part I addresses the Community's waste policy objectives and 
reviews the historic problem of non-compliance with these objec-
tives by the member states. Part II details the provisions of the 
amendment and its potential impact on Directive 75/442. Part III 
then examines current Community strategies for ensuring com-
pliance with environmental directives, and proposes new enforce-
ment measures for waste directives generally, and amended Di-
rective 75/442 in particular. This Note concludes that the 
achievement of full compliance with waste directives requires 
timely adoption of Community sanctioning and funding powers. 
I. COMMUNITY WASTE POLICY AND PROBLEMS WITH COMPLIANCE 
A. Policy Objectives and Provisions 
Enacted in 1975, Directive 75/442 was designed to reduce the 
quantity of waste produced, increase recycling and reuse of waste 
to the maximum extent possible, and provide for the safe disposal 
of any remaining non-recoverable wastes.9 To achieve these goals, 
Directive 75/442 requires member states to formulate waste dis-
posal plans,1O establish permitting systems for waste disposal, 
treatment, and storage installations, II and prevent the uncon-
trolled disposal of wastes. 12 Directive 75/442 incorporates the 
polluter-pays principle for cost allocation. 13 
1, at art. 3. The legislative history is unavailable, but member states were probably 
concerned with the costs associated with legislation mandating preventive waste measures. 
6 See generally Amendment, supra note I, at art. 1. Most of the amendment is dedicated 
to waste disposal provisions. 
7 See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
9 See Directive 75/442, supra note 2, at art. 3(2)(b). 
10 Id. at art. 4. 
II Id. at art. 7. 
12 Id. at art. 4. 
13 Id. at art. 11. The polluter-pays principle requires that the producer or holder of 
waste or both pay the costs of disposal. 
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Directive 75/442 also requires member states to submit to the 
Commission, every three years, a situation report on the texts of 
the main provisions of national laws adopted in accordance with 
the directive. 14 Finally, Directive 75/442 requires member states 
to encourage the prevention of waste generation and the reuse 
of waste. 15 
B. Historic Non-compliance by Member States 
Member state non-compliance has hampered the effectiveness 
of Directive 75/442.16 Initially, the Commission did not rigidly 
insist upon adherence to the two-year implementation deadline. 17 
In 1981, however, continued non-compliance with the directive 
prompted the Commission to bring suit against Belgium and Italy 
in the Court of Justice of the European Communities (Court of 
Justice).18 In Commission v. Belgium, the Commission alleged that 
Belgium failed to implement Directive 75/442. The Belgian Gov-
ernment argued that it had already partially implemented the 
directive but that constitutional difficulties impeded its full im-
plementation. 19 The Court of Justice held for the Commission, 
holding that a member state could not plead provisions, practices, 
or customs in its legislative or legal system to justify its failure to 
comply with a directive. 
An action against a member state before the Court of Justice 
is essentially the only course of action that the Commission can 
take to remedy member state non-compliance with directives. 20 
Nevertheless, Court of Justice judgments have had little effect on 
14 Id. at art. 12. 
15 Id. at art. 3. 
16 See, e.g., Case 30/81, Commission v. Italy, [1981] E.C.R. 3379 (1981); Case 69/81, 
Commission v. Belgium, [1982] E.C.R. 153 (1982). 
17 See EEC Members Face Deadlines for Implementing Environmental Directives, I Int'l Env't 
Rep. (BNA) No. I, at 5-6 (Jan. 10, 1978) [hereinafter EEC Members Face Deadlines]. 
18 See Case 69/81, [1982] E.C.R. at 166. 
19 See id. at 167. Belgium argued that implementation was hampered by institutional 
reforms "concerning the redistribution of powers and responsibilities between the national 
and regional institutions." Id. 
20 See L. BROWN & F. JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
76-78 (1989). The Commission may bring proceedings against a member state that has 
failed to meet its obligations under article 169 of the EEC Treaty. Such action involves 
three phases; the final and most serious is the rendering of a judgment by the Court of 
justice. Under Article 171, however, the judgment is only declaratory. There are no 
provisions for sanctions in cases of non-compliance. Member states are simply expected 
to take the measures needed to comply with the judgment. 
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the behavior of some member states because the Court of Justice 
can not impose fines or sanctions.21 This lack of enforcement 
power has contributed to the growing frustration with non-com-
pliance.22 Consequently, there are increased demands for re-
duced member state interpretive latitude,23 increased surveillance 
of member state compliance,24 and tougher methods of enforce-
ment.25 The amendment to Directive 75/442 reflects these con-
cerns.26 
II. THE AMENDMENT 
The amendment's primary emphasis is the creation of a coor-
dinated Community approach to waste disposal.27 Like Directive 
21 See New Unit Would Police Members' Actions in Implementing Environmental Standards, 13 
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No.2, at 42 (Feb. 14, 1990) [hereinafter Implementing Environmental 
Standards]. The Environment Commissioner of the European Community, Carlo Ripa di 
Meana, complained that countries such as Belgium and Italy have simply ignored court 
judgments ordering them to comply with Community environmental standards. 
22 Commission Officials Cite Disappointment in Community's Efforts on Waste Disposal, 13 Int'l 
Env't Rep. (BNA) No.6, at 239 (June 13, 1990) [hereinafter Commission Officials Cite 
Disappointment]. Commission officials told the British House of Commons that progress 
on controlling waste disposal in the Community was "disappointing." Id. See also European 
Environment Bureau Offers Criticism, Goals for EC Environment Council, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. 
(BNA) No.8, at 324 (Aug. 8, 1990); Monitoring the Implementation of Community Law on the 
Environment, Community Information Memo No. P-5, at 4 (Feb. 8, 1990) [hereinafter 
Info. Memo P-5]. Since 1975, proceedings for non-compliance have been initiated against 
all but one member state. See Info. Memo P-5, supra, at 4. See also Lomas, Environmental 
Protection, Economic Conflict and the European Community, 33 MCGILL L.J. 506, 536 (1988). 
[E]nvironmental policy and the collective Community goal of economic inte-
gration [have] been undermined by the economic self-interest of member states. 
Concerns about the economic costs of environmental policy initiatives are fre-
quently invoked. Calculations concerning the direct and indirect effects of pro-
posals on the productivity and competitiveness of home industries, as well as 
their likely impact on jobs, exert a powerful influence upon the positions adopted 
by individual member states. 
Lomas, supra, at 356. See also E. REHBINDER & R. STEWART, INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW, 
EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 91 (1985). 
23 See Restrictive Waste Management, supra note 4, at 149. Ursula Schliessner, a prominent 
German attorney, has stated that national waste management legislation will become less 
important because future Community legislation will leave "as little room as possible" for 
member states to enforce weaker measures. Id. 
24 See Environment Ministers Agree on Plan to Set Up European Environment Agency, 12 Int'l 
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 579 (Dec. 13, 1989); Parliament Plans to Establish Committee to 
Study Compliance with Environmental Laws, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No.8, at 320 (Aug. 
8, 1990) [hereinafter Parliament to Establish Committee]. 
25 See Implementing Environmental Standards, supra note 21, at 42. Mr. Ripa di Meana has 
stated that the Community "must consider the possibility of withholding certain funds if 
member states don't comply." Id. at 43. 
26 See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text. 
27 See Amendment, supra note I, at art. 1. 
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75/442, the amendment emphasizes the need for member states 
to encourage the adoption of waste prevention and recycling 
measures, yet member states still have significant latitude to de-
termine what measures they will take.28 The waste disposal pro-
visions, however, allow far less interpretive latitude.29 
The focus of the waste disposal program centers on the need 
for member states to establish an "integrated and adequate net-
work" of diposal installations, both independently and in coop-
eration with one another where necessary.30 This harmonization 
effort is designed to make the Community self-sufficient with 
regard to waste disposal.3' Another goal is to require member 
states to move individually toward self-sufficiency by requiring 
disposal of waste at appropriate sites nearest the point of pro-
duction.32 Those member states whose current programs are the 
least developed will bear the highest costs of such harmonization 
measures.33 
The amendment requires member states to appoint a "com-
petent authority" to draw up one or more waste management 
plans as soon as possible. 34 The amendment provides guidelines 
for disposal plans35 and an extensive list of the waste disposal 
operations that must obtain permits from the designated com-
petent authority.36 The amendment covers extensively the re-
quirements and scope of these permits.37 
28 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
29 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
30 See Amendment, supra note 1, at art 1(1)(art. 5(1)). 
3I See id. at Preamble, art. 1(1)(art. 5(1)). 
32 See id. at art. 1 (1)(art. 5(1)-(2)). 
33 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and to Parliament: A 
Community strategy for waste management, SEC(89) 934 final, at 20-21 (Sept. 18, 1989). 
"The cost of waste disposal is directly dependant on standards and regulations governing 
the construction and operation of the facility .... [H]armonization of technical standards 
for waste disposal plants is a basic priority for environmental protection; and it is har-
monization based on a high level of protection." Because the extent and effectiveness of 
waste management in member states is uneven and varies widely, it is logical to assume 
that the member states with less stringent programs will bear the heaviest costs in meeting 
the Community's standards. See id. at 21. 
34 Amendment, supra note I, at art I (I )(arts. 6, 7). 
35 Id. at art. 1(I)(arts. 7, 8). 
36 Id. at art. 1(I)(arts. 10, II, Annex IlA). Unlike Directive 75/442, the amendment 
contains an annex listing all waste disposal operations that must obtain a permit, including 
landfill operations, incineration on land or at sea, permanent storage, and numerous 
other operations. 
37 Id. at art. 1(1)(art. 9). Each permit must cover the types and quantities of waste, the 
technical requirements, the precautions to be taken, the disposal site, and the treatment 
method. 
418 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XIV, No.2 
The amendment also revises member state reporting require-
ments. Under Directive 75/442, member states were required to 
submit status reports every three years, but were not required to 
follow any particular guidelines.38 Member states must now base 
their status reports on a particular questionnaire provided by the 
Commission.39 Moreover, whereas Directive 75/442 required only 
that member states report the "main provisions" of national laws 
that were adopted in compliance with the directive,40 the amend-
ment now requires member states to report all pertinent texts of 
nationallaws.41 
Like Directive 75/442, the amendment does not specify en-
forcement actions to be taken in the event of non-compliance. 
The amendment's increased specificity and stricter reporting re-
quirements, however, appear to limit the ability of member states 
to circumvent its provisions, and have provided the Community 
with more efficient methods of monitoring compliance. This 
seems to reflect the Community'S intentions to act more quickly 
to enforce compliance with the amended directive than it did to 
enforce Directive 75/442.42 Increased pressure on the Community 
from environmental groups and others to act against member 
state non-compliance supports this proposition.43 
III. PROSPECTS FOR COMPLIANCE AND SUCCESS 
Over the past two decades, the Community has adopted two 
strategies to ensure compliance with anti-pollution directives. 
First, the Community has attempted to persuade member states 
that they have an economic interest in compliance.44 Second, 
38 Directive 75/442, supra note 2, at art. 12. 
39 Amendment, supra note I, at art. 1(1)(art. 16(1)). "Member states shall send the 
Commission a report on the measures taken to implement this Directive. This report shall 
be based on a questionnaire ... which the Commission shall send to the member states 
.... " Id. 
40 Directive 75/442, supra note 2, at art. 14. 
4' Amendment, supra note I, at art. 2(2). 
42 See Implementing Environmental Standards, supra note 21, at 43; Parliament to Establish 
Committee, supra note 24, at 320. 
4S EC Seen as Bringing Increased Pressure on Spain to Comply with Community Directives, 13 
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No.7, at 284-85 (July 11, 1990). Complaints to Brussels alleging 
non-compliance with environmental directives throughout the Community increased from 
five in 1986 to 500 in 1989. 
44 The Commission Adopts a Community Strategy for Waste Management, Community Infor-
mation Memo No. P-52, at 1-2, (Sept. 3, 1989) [hereinafter Info. Memo P-52]. 
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where persuasion fails, the Community has resorted to enforce-
ment action through the Court of Justice.45 
A. Persuading Member States to Comply 
The Community's "persuasion" tactics stress two main themes. 
First, the Community urges that a strong waste management 
policy will provide jobs and save natural resources.46 Second, the 
Community argues that if compliance is not achieved, "the com-
pletion of the internal market may ... be jeopardized as a result 
of distortions of competition, unwarranted switching of invest-
ment or market compartmentalization."47 It is unlikely, however, 
that merely repeating these themes-without proof of the benefits 
that compliance can bring to individual member states-will guar-
antee their cooperation.48 
The Community believes that the need for member states to 
comply with its waste disposal program is virtually self-evident.49 
The Community generates 2.2 billion tons of waste per year, the 
sheer volume of which appears to reinforce the need for a co-
ordinated, Community-wide plan.50 Nevertheless, member states 
that are less developed and relatively clean may regard such 
measures as unnecessarily costly and burdensome. 51 Moreover, 
because it is probable that the less effective waste disposal pro-
grams exist in the less developed member states, the highest costs 
of compliance may befall those who can least afford them.52 As 
45 See Implementing Environmental Standards, supra note 21, at 42. 
46 See Info. Memo P-52, supra note 44, at 1-2. 
47 Id. at 2. 
48 Statistical evidence highlights the failures of the current strategy. By early 1990,62 
infringement procedures had been initiated for member state non-compliance with waste 
directives. See Info. Memo P-5, supra note 22, at 4. 
49 See Info. Memo P-52, supra note 44, at 2. While the Community recognizes that 
waste disposal problems in the past were solved at the local level, it believes the current 
volume and diversity of waste has outpaced the ability of local governments to handle it 
safely. 
50 Id. at 1. 
51 See E. REHBINDER, supra note 22, at 263. Although generalizations are difficult, 
[m]ember states located at the margins of the Community, which have large 
underdeveloped, relatively clean regions for which expensive environmental 
controls are too costly in relation to the benefits derived from them, are often 
more reluctant to agree to a [costly] environmental policy than the richer, more 
densely populated states in the center of the Community. 
Id. 
52 Haigh, The Environmental Policy of the European Community and 1992, 12 Int'l Env't 
Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 619 (Dec. 13, 1989). Member state implementation of Community 
legislation is inevitably intertwined with national policies, practices, and interests. Concerns 
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a result, the Community's strategy of persuading member states 
to comply with the amendment will probably meet with limited 
success.53 
B. Enforcement Strategy 
Current enforcement strategy is slow and ineffective. 54 One 
remedy would be to increase the monitoring of member state 
compliance, thereby decreasing the time needed to discover non-
compliance.55 Community environment mmlsters recently 
adopted a directive that could provide "watchdog groups" with 
information needed to report instances of non-compliance. 56 The 
directive provides citizens with greater access to environmental 
information held by member states.57 The directive, however, 
permits member states to deny access to information in many 
instances, and therefore may greatly diminish the monitoring 
capacity of watchdog groups.58 
Another effort to more closely monitor member state compli-
ance was the establishment of the European Environment Agency 
(EEA).59 The new EEA has been criticized, however, because an 
over the impact of Community legislation will vary from state to state given that the 
starting point for each member state will be different. 
5S See id. at 621. "Several of the newer member states are arguing that they need EC 
money to fulfill the obligations in EC [environmental] legislation." Id. Attempts to keep 
the costs of compliance low will probably account for most instances of non-compliance. 
See Lomas, supra note 22, at 356. 
54 See Implementing Environmental Standards, supra note 21, at 42-43; Vivier, Preventing 
Waste and Managing the Burden of the Past, 2 EUR. ENV'T REV., at 11 (Mar. 1988). 
55 See Amendment, supra note I, at art. 1 (l)(arts. 10, 12.) 
56 See Directive 90/313, Council Directive of 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to 
information on the environment, 0.]. Ll58/56 (1990). 
57 See Ministers Accept New Rules Guaranteeing Public Access to Environmental Information, 
13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No.4, at 143-44 (Apr. 11,1990). Scheduled to become effective 
January I, 1993, the directive gives anyone, upon written request, the right of access to 
any environmental information held by public authorities. It also requires member states 
to provide information more frequently through regular publication of reports. 
58 Id. at 144. Requests for information can be denied if they are deemed to affect 
matters before a court, under inquiry, or the subject of a preliminary investigation; the 
confidentiality of government proceedings; industrial and commercial confidentiality; the 
confidentiality of personal data; material supplied by third parties under legal obligation; 
and material which, if disclosed, would make environmental damage more likely. 
A spokesman for the European Environment Bureau, to which most EC-based envi-
ronmental lobby groups belong, stated that "the directive doesn't really give any weight 
to persons seeking information, and it is little more than wishful thinking." Id. 
59 See Regulation 1210/90, Council Regulation for the establishment of the European 
Environment Agency and the European environment information network, 0.]. L120/1 
(1990); Environment Ministers Set Up Agency but Site Location Remains Uncertain, 13 Int'l 
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increase in monitoring may accelerate initiation of enforcement 
action, but does not resolve the inherent ineffectiveness of en-
forcement actions.60 The Parliament of the European Commu-
nities (Parliament) wants the EEA to play a much larger role in 
environmental affairs. The Environment Committee of the Par-
liament believes that the EEA should have its own environmental 
inspectorate to enforce Community rules. Nevertheless, member 
states have rejected the possibility of the EEA playing a regulatory 
role, a task which remains the responsibility of the Commission.61 
The Commission has demonstrated its disappointment with 
non-compliance and seems willing to expand its enforcement 
methods.62 In February 1990, the Commission announced its 
desire to establish a "green police force" under the control of the 
Commission, to ensure member state compliance.63 Police force 
discovery of non-compliance could lead to withdrawal of Com-
munity funds and subsidies. The Commission currently has no 
sanctioning powers, however, and it has not yet developed a 
strategy for obtaining such powers.51 
C. New Methods to Ensure Compliance 
It is unlikely that all member states will be able to fully comply 
with the amended waste directive within the two years allotted.65 
The new strategy needed to ensure compliance requires the Com-
munity to adopt Community sanctioning powers and to create a 
viable Community environment fund, both of which could take 
longer than two years to implement.66 Focusing the Community's 
attention on achieving a new strategy is not a futile exercise, 
however, because it could mean the difference between late com-
pliance and non-compliance. 
Env't Rep. (BNA) No.4, at 144 (Apr. 11, 1990). The EEA's purpose is to collect and 
disseminate environmental data and statistics. 
60 See Parliament Calls for Stronger Role for Proposed European Environment Agency, 13 Int'l 
Env't Rep. (BNA) No.2, at 43 (Feb. 14, 1990). 
61 See Environment Ministers Agree on Plan to Set Up European Environment Agency, 12 Int'l 
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 579 (Dec. 13, 1989). 
62 See Commission Officials Cite Disappointment, supra note 22, at 239. The Commission's 
Environment Committee apparently agrees with a report from the EC directorate on 
environment, which notes that the Community has "reached the boundaries of control 
using traditional legislative and regulatory measure." Id. 
63 See Implementing Environmental Standards, supra note 21, at 42. 
64 Id. See also L. BROWN, supra note 20, at 76-78. 
65 See Amendment, supra note 1, at art. 2(1). 
66 See infra note 68. 
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Sanctioning powers are important to any new Community strat-
egy because they will function as a deterrent to non-compliance.67 
For the Community to achieve sanctioning power, however, all 
member states must agree to amend the Treaty of Rome.68 Mem-
ber states with a history of non-compliance would find voting for 
sanctioning powers to be contrary to their unwillingness to com-
ply. Likewise, limiting or withdrawing various Community funds 
will not facilitate compliance by member states that find compli-
ance economically difficult. In addition, member states would 
probably view the imposition of sanctions as an assault on their 
political sovereignty.6g 
To make sanctions palatable to member states, the Community 
must also provide some form of positive inducement. Community 
sanctioning powers might be more acceptable to economically 
disadvantaged member states if the Community were to provide 
meaningful financial assistance to aid them with compliance. To 
date, Community funding for environmental causes has been 
limited. 70 
The possibility of establishing a Community environment fund 
has received considerable attention lately.7! For instance, the 
67 The Community may want to structure its sanctioning powers similar to those of 
article 88 of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (ECSC Treaty). See Treaty 
Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,261 V.N.T.S. II. 
The ECSC Treaty provisions are such that with a Court determination in favor of the 
Commission, and Council approval by a two-thirds majority, sanctions could include "the 
suspension of payment otherwise due to be paid by the Commission to the State in default 
or the taking of discriminatory measures ... (e.g. a ban on imports from the State in 
question)." L. BROWN, supra note 20, at 79. 
68 See Implementing Environmental Standards, supra note 21, at 43. Because it would 
require the approval of every member state, adoption of an amendment would take 
considerable time. Given proper leadership, however, it is not beyond the capability of 
the Community. Commissioner Ripa di Meana has proposed consideration of the matter 
at an intergovernmental conference. 
69 New European Council President Flynn to Push Advancement of Environment Policy, 13 
InCI Env't Rep. (BNA) No. I, at 9 (Jan. 10, 1990). Padraig Flynn, former President of 
the Council of Environment Ministers, has stated that "over-reliance on policing for 
compelling good environmental behavior can be disadvantageous." Id. 
70 See Haigh, supra note 52, at 621. "Whereas other EC policies are pursued very largely 
by financial means-e.g., the agricultural policy and regional policy-by contrast, envi-
ronmental policy has so far been pursued by legislation." Id. 
71 See Ministers Advocate Use of Taxes, Fees to Boost Impact of Environmental Policies, 13 Int'l 
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 383 (Sept. 26, 1990). "European Community environment 
ministers agree that economic and fiscal measures should be used in the future as a basic 
means of increasing the efficacy of EC Environment policy .... " Id. A Community 
"ecotax" would be the most likely means of financing an environment fund. See Various 
Environmental Taxes May Be Introduced by End of 1990, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No.6, at 
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Community is considering offering funds to assist compliance, 
provided that the member state and the Commission are able to 
establish a detailed program of receipt. 72 Nevertheless, despite 
general agreement that both sanctioning powers and funding 
programs are needed, sanctioning powers and funding programs 
have not been linked in any comprehensive enforcement pro-
posal.73 
Creation of a Community funding program should be made 
contingent on member state acceptance of the Community's right 
to impose sanctions. If it is not, the Community will have lost an 
effective bargaining chip that could have been used to obtain 
sanctioning powers. While creation of an environmental fund 
would itself provide additional incentive for member state com-
pliance with the amended directive, no Community environment 
fund can pay all the costs of compliance. Absent Community 
sanctions or other means of making the costs of non-compliance 
felt, some member states may still view the costs of compliance 
as prohibitive.74 
CONCLUSION 
Current prospects for full member state compliance with the 
amended waste directive are limited. While the amendment does 
limit member states' interpretive latitude, it does not provide 
additional incentives-either positive or negative-for member 
states to comply. To ensure full compliance with sometimes costly 
and burdensome environmental directives, the Community must 
be able to provide financial assistance for member state compli-
ance, and impose sanctions for non-compliance. 
David W. Johnston 
226 (June 13, 1990). Use of the fund could be modeled after member state programs 
that grant subsidies on a case-by-case basis to promote clean technologies and assist 
member states with compliance. See Commission Expected to Consider Issue of Using Taxes to 
Promote Pollution Control, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 383 (Sept. 26, 1990). 
72 See Implementing Environmental Standards, supra note 21, at 43. 
7S Id. According to Commissioner Ripa di Meana, "Over the past 12 months there has 
been increasing public pressure on the Commission to produce results .... We must 
consider setting up a green police force under the control of the Commission which will 
have the power to investigate and administer sanctions." Id. 
74 See Lomas, supra note 22, and accompanying text. 
